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Abstract
In the early 1990s, hoping to reduce chronic electricity shortages and enhance the
efficiency of Chinese power plants, China opened its doors to foreign direct investment (FDI)
in electricity generation.  Using data from an original survey of US private investors, official
Chinese statistics, and other sources, we assess the volume and characteristics of FDI in
China's power sector, its impact on energy efficiency, and the factors that limit this impact.
Our five principal findings are as follows.  First, the volume FDI in China's power sector will
likely fall short of the government's 1995 - 2000 capacity expansion target by a substantial
margin, most likely because of persistent institutional barriers to FDI.  Second, to avoid the
lengthy central government approval process for large plants and to minimize risk, early FDI
tended to be in small-scale, gas- and oil-fired plants using imported equipment and located in
coastal provinces.  However, more recent FDI tends to be in larger coal-fired plants that use
more Chinese equipment and tends to be located in the north as well as the east.  Third, and
perhaps most important, FDI is likely having a significant positive impact on energy
efficiency.  Almost a third of the 20 FDI plants in our survey sample use advanced efficiency-
enhancing generating technologies, and a fifth are cogeneration plants.  Fourth, the main
factor that has hampered the contribution of FDI to energy efficiency is an institutional bias in
favor of small-scale plants which are generally not as energy efficient as the large-scale
plants.  And finally, the most important barriers to FDI generally are uncertainty associated
with the approval process of FDI projects, electricity sector regulation, and the risk of default
on power purchase contracts.
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FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN CHINA'S POWER SECTOR:
TRENDS, BENEFITS AND BARRIERS
Allen Blackman and Xun Wu*
1.  INTRODUCTION
In the early 1990s, hoping to reduce chronic electricity shortages and enhance the
productivity of Chinese power plants, China opened its doors to foreign direct investment
(FDI) in electricity generation.  China's efforts to attract FDI were met with a wave of
enthusiasm.  Hundreds of preliminary contracts for Sino-foreign joint ventures were drawn
up.  Yet, only a small fraction of these contracts have been realized.  Moreover, many of the
foreign invested plants that have been built have not had the characteristics and impacts that
the central government had hoped for.
China's success in attracting FDI into the power sector will have importance beyond
reducing shortages and enhancing productivity.  China is the world's third leading source of
greenhouse gas emissions and its power sector is responsible for almost a third of these
emissions.1  Hence, to the extent that FDI can enhance the energy efficiency of Chinese
plants, it can reduce greenhouse gas emissions.  Also, by improving energy efficiency, FDI
can reduce emissions of conventional pollutants and can alleviate persistent coal supply and
transportation problems.2
Thus far, the academic literature describing FDI in China's power sector has been
thin.3  The literature that does exist does not include detailed information on foreign investors'
perceptions of the investment climate, on the volume and characteristics of FDI, or on the
energy efficiency of FDI plants.  This paper attempts to fill this gap by marshaling data from a
variety of sources including an original survey of US private investors, official Chinese
                                               
* The authors are, respectively, Fellow, Quality of the Environment Division, Resources for the Future, and
Doctoral Candidate, University of North Carolina, Durham.
1 In 1996, China's emissions of carbon dioxide, the most important greenhouse gas, totaled 805 mtc,
approximately 13 percent of the world's total (DOE, 1998).  China's share of global emissions is expected to
reach 15 percent by 2000 and 25 percent by 2050 (Rose et al., 1996).  Power plants were responsible for
approximately 183 million tons of carbon emissions in 1990, twenty-nine percent of the country's total emissions
(Zhai, 1993).  This share will undoubtedly grow as the Chinese economy matures and new capacity is added.
Since the vast majority of China's power plants will be coal-fired for the foreseeable future, improving energy
efficiency, not fuel switching, will be the most practical means of abating greenhouse gas emissions.
2 Power plants are a leading source of pollution in China.  In 1994, they were responsible for 28 percent of the
total emissions of particulates and 32 percent of total emissions of sulfur dioxide (Battelle, 1998).
3 Two recent articles that discuss FDI in the Chinese power sector are Li and Dorian (1996) and Murray et al.
(1998).  The latter includes a discussion of two topics that are outside the scope of the present paper:  non-direct
foreign investment and the impact of foreign investment on pollution control.Blackman and Wu  RFF 98-50
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statistics, and trade journals.  We address four specific questions regarding FDI in China's
power sector:
• What have been its volume and characteristics?
• What has been its impact on energy efficiency?
• What factors limit this impact?
• What factors constrain FDI in the power sector generally?
The paper is organized as follows.  The first section provides background information
on the location, size, type and efficiency of existing Chinese plants and on the supply and
demand for electricity.  The second section discusses the need for foreign investment in the
power sector; popular institutional structures for FDI; the volume, origin, and location of FDI;
the gap between contracted and realized foreign investment; and institutional barriers to FDI.
The third section presents survey data on American investment in the power sector.  The final
section sums up and concludes.
2.  BACKGROUND
2.1 Location, Type, Size of Power Plants
China's power sector, comprised of approximately 12,000 plants with an installed
capacity of over 220 GW, is the second largest in the world (Basic Statistics of Industrial
Enterprises, 1996).  Sixty-five percent of China's generating capacity is concentrated in
relatively industrial and heavily populated East, South-Central, and South-West regions
(Table 1).
Seventy-five percent of China's generating capacity is thermal and the vast majority of
the remainder is hydroelectric (Table 1).  Ninety percent of all energy in the power sector is
coal-derived, a fact that explains the power sector's importance as a source of CO2 emissions
(Tunnah et al., 1994).4  Less than one percent of China's electric capacity is gas-fired.  China
has substantial gas reserves located offshore and in the Southwest and Northwest regions but
lacks the infrastructure needed to exploit and transport it.
Hydroelectric capacity is fairly limited, accounting for 23 percent of total capacity and
mainly located in the western and southern regions.  Although China's exploitable hydropower
reserves, estimated at 380 GW, are regarded as the world's largest, less than 10 percent of these
reserves have been developed (International Private Power Quarterly, 1998 II).  China plans to
build many large hydropower plants in the next 20 years including the 18 GW Three Gorges
project.
                                               
4 The power sector consumed 430 million tons of coal in 1995, a quarter of the country's total consumption.
Consumption is expected to rise to 600 million tons by 2000, and 960 million tons by 2010 (Johnson et al., 1996).Blackman and Wu  RFF 98-50
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Table 1.  Location and type of installed generation capacity (1995)
Region5 Hydro % Thermal % Other % All plants %
North 4 96 0 15
North East 17 83 0 12
East 14 86 0 29
S.-Central 34 63 2 26
South West 54 46 0 10
N.-West 37 63 0 8
All 23 75 2 100
(Source: The Yearbook of Electric Power in China, 1995)
China's two operational nuclear plants in the coastal provinces of Zhejiang and
Guangdong have a combined capacity of 2.1 GW, less than one percent of the country's total
capacity.  China plans to add a total of 20 GW in new nuclear capacity by 2010 (DOE,
1998).
Even by developing country standards, the average unit size in China is quite small.
Fully 40 percent of generating capacity is in units smaller than 100 MW and only 23 percent
of capacity is in units larger than 300 MW (Table 2).  By comparison, in most industrialized
countries 60 to 80 percent of capacity is in units larger than 300 MW (Murray et al., 1998).
A sizable percentage of electricity demand is met by private-use generators (these
generators are not counted as power plants Tables 1 and 2).  Though most private-use
generators are smaller than one MW, many are larger.  In fact, over seven percent of all
power plants larger than six MW are for private-use (The Yearbook of Electric Power in
China, 1995).
Approximately 24 percent of China's generating units are imported (Table 2).  This
proportion is higher for very large and very small units.  Large units tend to be imported
because China lacks the technological capability to build generators larger than 350 MW.
Small units tend to be imported because small plants frequently install imported diesel
equipment.
                                               
5 Definition of regions:  North (Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shanxi, Inner Mongolia); Northeast (Liaoning, Jilin,
Heilongjiang); East (Shanghai, Jianngsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Fujian, Jiangxi, Shandong); South-central (Henan,
Hunan, Hubei, Guangdong, Guangxi, Hainan); Southwest (Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunan, Xizang); Northwest
(Shannxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, Xinjiang)Blackman and Wu  RFF 98-50
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Table 2.  Size and origin of generating units (1995)







300 + 147 51.9 24 38
200 - 299 202 41.8 19 13
100 - 199 318 36.8 17 13
50 - 99 402 22.2 10 22
25 - 49 577 16.3 8 25
12 - 24 955 12.5 6 21
6 - 11 1,575 11.5 5 37
0 - 5 ** 24.2 11 **
All 4,176* 217.2 100% 24*
* For units larger than six MW.
** Missing
(Source: The Yearbook of Electric Power in China, 1995)
2.2   Power Demand and Supply
During the last 20 years, the rapid pace of economic development in China has fueled
an equally rapid growth in electricity demand.  Between 1980 and 1996 electricity demand
increased by 258 percent, from 301 TWh to 1,079 TWh (Tan, 1997).  The growth in demand
has stemmed not only from a rapid increase in the total volume of economic activity but also
from the mechanization of agriculture, rural electrification, and the proliferation of electric
appliances and electricity-intensive industrial activities such as petrochemicals manufacturing.
Using 1996 as a baseline, demand is projected to increase by 29 to 36 percent by 2000, by 107
to 164 percent by 2010, and by 220 to 340 percent by 2020 (Battelle, 1998).6
Not surprisingly, electricity supply has failed to keep up with demand.  Supply
currently falls 15 to 20 percent short of demand (DOE, 1998).  The economic value of power
shortages has been substantial.  In 1993, $27.6 billion of industrial value added was lost due
to power shortages, the equivalent of seven percent of GDP (Li and Dorian, 1995).
Supply and demand conditions vary regionally and temporally.  Recent capacity
expansion, power conservation measures, and economic downturns have eliminated or greatly
mitigated shortages in Guangdong province and in the Northeast region.  The most severe
shortages are in the East, Northwest, and Central regions and in the Southwest region outside
of Guangdong.  Shortages occur mainly during peak periods of demand.  China has few
                                               
6 In 1994, heavy industry accounted for 60% of electricity demand; light industry 15%, residential users 10%,
agriculture 6%, public and commercial users 7%, and transportation and communication 2% (MEP, 1995).Blackman and Wu  RFF 98-50
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"peaking plants" devoted specifically to providing power during high demand periods (IPPQ
1998 II; O'Neill, 1997).
China's central electric power authorities -- formerly the Ministry of Electric Power
(MEP) and now the State Power Corporation -- have developed ambitious plans to reduce
shortages by expanding generating capacity to 290 GW by 2000, and 525 GW by 2010 (Tan,
1997).7  These targets imply that an average of 14.6 GW of new capacity per year must be
added from 1996 through 2000 (the equivalent of three 400 MW plants per month), and 23.5
GW per year must be added from 2001 through 2010 (Table 3).  The PRC has made
expansion of capacity in Central and Western regions an explicit goal for the year 2000 and
beyond.  Since 1980, China has installed over 150 GW of new capacity and growth has been
accelerating (Table 3).  In 1996, a record high 19.3 GW were installed.









1981 69.1 3.3 309.3
1982 72.4 3.2 327.7
1983 76.5 4.1 351.4
1984 80.1 3.7 377.7
1985 87.1 6.9 410.7
1986 93.8 6.8 449.6
1987 102.9 9.1 497.7
1988 115.5 12.6 545.1
1989 126.7 11.1 584.7
1990 137.9 11.3 621.3
1991 151.5 13.6 677.5
1992 166.5 15.1 754.2
1993 182.9 16.4 836.4
1994 199.9 17.0 927.9
1995 217.2 17.3 1006.9
1996 236.5 19.3 1079.4
target 2000 290 14.6* 1400
target 2010 525 23.5*
* average annual change required over previous 5 or 10 years
(Source: Tan 1997)
                                               
7 In March 1998, the Ministry of Electric Power was abolished.  Most of its functions have been assumed by the
State Power Corporation.Blackman and Wu  RFF 98-50
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2.3   Energy Efficiency
The energy efficiency of power generation in China is quite low by industrialized
country standards.  The average thermal efficiency of China's power plants is 25 to 29 percent
compared to rates of 35 to 38 percent in industrialized countries (Worldwide Electric Power
Industry, 1996; Murray 1998).
The low energy efficiency of Chinese power plants is due to at least five factors.  First,
as described above, Chinese plants are quite small by international standards.  For technical
reasons, small thermal plants are rarely as efficient as large ones.  The average thermal
efficiency of China's smallest plants is roughly half that of its largest plants (Tunnah et al.,
1994).  The prevalence of small plants is largely an historical artifact.  As late as 1987,
86 percent of China's total generating capacity was comprised of plants smaller than 100 MW
(Battelle, 1998).  Widespread electricity shortages have caused small units to be kept on line as
long as possible and new small plants to be built to meet urgent local needs.  Second, even
controlling for unit size, equipment used in Chinese plants is often relatively inefficient.  In
Chinese thermal plants in 1995, the percentage of electricity generated used internally (an
indicator efficiency) averaged eight percent, two to four percentage points higher than the
average in industrialized countries (The Yearbook of Electric Power in China, 1995, and
Sathaye, 1992).  The inefficiency of Chinese equipment is partly due to its age.  Also, in the
past, generating units made in China were simply not as efficient as those made abroad.  As
recently as the late 1980s, some 200 MW Chinese units had heat rates 10 percent higher than
comparable sets made in industrialized countries (Sathaye, 1992).8  Third, Chinese coal is
generally of poor quality.  Average ash content is 17 percent (versus 10 percent in the United
States) so heating value is low (Hoppe, 1998).  Northern coal is better quality than southern
coal, and as a result, massive amounts of coal are shipped from the north to the south.  Fourth,
as noted above, China has relatively few peaking plants.  As a result, power plants often run at
less than full capacity during slack periods or are cycled on and off, practices that greatly
reduce efficiency.  Finally, for a variety reasons including a lack of competitive market
pressures, bureaucratization, and bottlenecks in transmission and distribution, the management
of many Chinese plants is suboptimal.  The efficiency gains from adopting the management
practices of industrialized countries are on the order of two to four percent (Yang, 1997).
Chinese power authorities have made improving generating efficiency a priority.  The
power authority plans to increase the average thermal efficiency of power generation to
33 percent by 2000 and 35 percent in 2010 by discouraging the building of small plants,
introducing high-efficiency units, and retrofitting or eliminating low-efficiency units (Li and
Dorian, 1995).  A 1994 report on energy efficiency prepared by the MEP in partnership with
                                               
8 Since this time, the quality of Chinese equipment smaller than 300 MW has improved.  According to one trade
journal, Chinese units smaller than 300 MW are now comparable in quality with those of Western manufacture
(Starke, 1997).  The willingness of international banks to provided limited recourse financing for Sino-foreign
joint venture power projects that use Chinese equipment exclusively (e.g., the Changsha project described in
Section 3.4) lends credence to this view.Blackman and Wu  RFF 98-50
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the United Nations and World Bank included ambitious energy efficiency targets (Table 4).
More recently, the Ninth Five Year Plan (1996-2000) sets forth a number of specific energy
efficiency strategies including:  replacing 8 GW of small units with 12 GW of large ones and
encouraging the diffusion of cogeneration and advanced generating technologies (Tan, 1997).
It will prove helpful to provide some background on the last strategy.
Table 4.  Energy efficiency:  average FDI sample plant heat rates versus
targets for all Chinese plants, averages for new Chinese plants,
















500-600 282 (2)d 364-380 353 348 n/a 358 (5)
250-350 335 (2) 375-380 353 348 378 (8) 370 (1)
125 327 (3)e 402-435 424 413 432 (2) 387 (2)
0-50 (high pr.) 351 (8)f 467-478 457-467 n/a n/a 412 (488)
All 338 (15)
a Assuming 8% internal use rate.
b Plants with uniform unit sizes fitting the definition of 'large industrial enterprise' built
between 1982 and 1992.
c US Plants with uniform unit sizes built between 1985 and 1995.
d Both units are larger than 600 MW.
e Includes one 115 MW combined cycle gas turbine (CCGT) unit.
f Includes three CCGT plants, one integrated gasification combined cycle (IGCC) plant,
and one circulating fluidized bed (CFB) plant.
(Sources: Survey; MEP, 1993; Tunnah et al., 1994; DOE, 1995)
The four principal types of advanced thermal generating technologies are atmospheric
fluidized bed combustion (AFBC), pressurized fluidized bed combustion (PFBC), integrated
gasification combined cycle (IGCC), and combined cycle gas turbine (CCGT).  All enhance
efficiency.  The two fluidized bed technologies combust coal mixed with gases.  The more
advanced PFBC units operate at thermal efficiencies 40-42 percent as compared to 36-38
percent efficiencies of large conventional pulverized coal steam turbines.  China currently has
hundreds of domestically produced small AFBC units in operation as well as a number of larger
imported units.  It has also built small and medium sized PFBC demonstration units.  IGCCBlackman and Wu  RFF 98-50
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technologies use gasified coal in combination with gas turbines to achieve efficiencies of 43
percent.  CCGT technologies use natural gas or oil in combination with gas turbines and achieve
efficiencies in excess of 50 percent.  China does not currently have the capacity to manufacture
IGCC or CCGT units domestically.  However, it has bought and licensed 29 IGCC units.  All of
these advanced technologies have capital costs that are currently significantly higher than those
for conventional coal-fired plants (Battelle, 1998; Hoppe, 1997).9
Thus far, China's progress in improving energy efficiency in the power has been less
than hoped for.  Though 170.6 GW of new thermal power was added between 1980 and 1995--
a 259 percent increase--the average net heat rate for all plants only fell by only 8.7 percent
from 448 gCE/kWh to 412 gCE/kWh and the percentage of electricity used internally stagnated
at roughly eight percent (Tan, 1997; The Yearbook of Electric Power in China, 1995; Tunnah
et al., 1994).10  Clearly, capacity expansion alone will not lead to significant reductions in
energy efficiency.  Indeed, the composition of recent investments has been less than ideal from
the perspective of energy efficiency.  For example, fully 14 percent of capacity added in 1995
was in units smaller than 6 MW (versus 13 percent nationwide; The Yearbook of Electric
Power in China, 1995).
3. FDI IN CHINA'S POWER SECTOR
3.1 Requirements
To meet its ambitious capacity expansion targets, China will need to attract foreign
investment for two reasons.  First, China lacks the manufacturing wherewithal to supply the
needed generating equipment.  Its production capacity has been estimated at between 9 and
12.5 GW per year, significantly lower than yearly expansion targets of 14.6 to 23.5 GW
(Dorian, 1995; Murray et al., 1998).  More important, China lacks the required financial
resources.  Power authorities estimate that China will only be able to finance 80 percent of the
investment needed to meet it year 2000 capacity target with domestic resources (Shi, 1997).
This implies that a total of 18 GW of new foreign funded capacity will be needed between
1996 and 2000.  Assuming average capacity costs of $US 600 to 800 per kW, the total capital
required will be $US 11 to 14 billion.
Traditionally, China has relied on public sector sources to supply foreign capital for
the power sector.  From 1979 to 1996 overseas sources invested approximately $14.3 billion
in the Chinese power sector, approximately 10 percent of total investment during that period
(Tan, 1997).  Eighty-five percent of the foreign funds were provided by foreign governments
and multilateral lending institutions like the World Bank and Asian Development Bank
                                               
9 For example, capital costs (in US$ per kilowatt) for the six different technologies are:  subcritical steam
pressure conventional coal-fired, $603-63; super-critical steam pressure conventional coal-fired, $663-724;
IGCC, $1,327; PFBC, $1,327; and CCGT, $850 (Battelle, 1998).
10 Heat rates indicate the amount of energy consumed per unit of electricity generated.  Net heat rates do not
count electricity used by generating plants as output, while gross heat rates do.  We use grams of coal equivalent
(gCE) to measure energy.  One metric ton of coal equivalent contains 20.9 gigajoules.Blackman and Wu  RFF 98-50
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(Dorian, 1995).  Given the volume of funds required, China can not rely solely on these
sources.  The foreign capital needed between 1995 and 2000 is at least as great as the total
amount of capital received from public-sector sources from 1979 to 1996.  In addition, the
short time horizon envisioned by Chinese planners is not compatible with the lengthy
planning and approval processes associated with public sector funding.  Thus, foreign direct
investment is needed to cover expected financing short-falls.
But FDI is not only attractive as a source of funds.  As noted in the introduction, it has
the potential to enhance energy efficiency by expediting the transfer of advanced generating
technologies and management techniques and by introducing competition into a sector that
has always been a bastion of state control.
Recognizing these needs and benefits, the central government has made attracting FDI
an explicit goal.  In the mid-1990s it undertook a number of measures either designed explicitly
to attract FDI into the power sector or that have had that effect, including:  raising electricity
tariffs in August 1993; hosting a conference designed to attract FDI in May 1994; reforming
foreign exchange in January 1994; initiating a sweeping reform of electricity regulation (the
Law on Electric Power) including rules governing FDI in December 1995; issuing a notice for
tendered Build-Operate-Transfer projects in August 1995; and creating the China Power
Investment Corporation to raise capital international for power projects in late 1995 (Petroleum
Economist, 1996).  These actions resulted in a flurry of activity.  Dorian (1995) estimates that
by 1995 there were 400 to 500 FDI projects in various stages of negotiation.
3.2   Institutional Arrangements
The institutional arrangements available for FDI in the Chinese power sector are:
cooperative joint ventures, wholly-owned foreign ventures, equity joint ventures, build-
operate-transfer (BOT) projects, build-operate-own (BOO) projects, commercial loans, and
stock and bond investments in existing Chinese power enterprises (Turner, 1997a).
Cooperative joint ventures accord foreign investors more control than equity joint
ventures but less than wholly-owned joint ventures.  The advantage of cooperative joint
ventures compared to wholly-owned joint ventures is that they generally facilitate intangible
but critical political alliances as well as more secure access to scarce inputs like fuel, foreign
exchange and expertise.  Foreign firms undertaking cooperative joint ventures usually do so
with local power bureaus or other local governmental authorities.
BOT contracts, which have become increasingly popular in recent years, call for a
foreign firm to finance, design, and construct a plant, to operate it for a fixed term, and then to
turn it over to the state.  The first BOT power project (Shajio B in Guangdong, a 2x350 MW
coal-fired plant) was completed in 1987 by Hopewell, a Hong Kong firm and was to be turned
over to China in 1997.  BOT projects can be cooperative joint ventures, equity joint ventures,
or wholly-owned ventures.
Private entities generally provide commercial loans at less favorable terms (higher
interest rates and shorter terms) than public sector sources.  Loans are either made directly to
a Chinese power company or are channeled through a Chinese bank.Blackman and Wu  RFF 98-50
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3.3   Volume, Origin, Size, and Location of FDI Plants
Despite considerable efforts to attract FDI, in the last several years actual levels of
FDI in Chinese power generation have been moderate.  By June 1998, 24 FDI plants with a
combined capacity of 4.9 GW were in operation, and another 12 plants with a combined
capacity of 9.0 GW were under construction (Table 5).11
Given that a power plant usually takes two to four years to build, only projects that
have already begun construction are likely to be brought on-line by 2000.  Therefore, at most,
14 GW of FDI-financed new capacity will have been added by 2000.  But 8.9 GW of this
investment was contributed by Chinese partners in cooperative joint ventures or was built
before 1995.  Hence, FDI thus far has been somewhat disappointing given the implicit target
of 18 GW of foreign invested capacity between 1995 and 2000.
US companies are clearly the dominant players in FDI in the Chinese power sector.
They are responsible for 25 of the 36 plants in operation and under construction (Table 5).
The market is somewhat concentrated.  Nineteen firms have projects that are in operation or
under construction.  Four of these firms--AES China Generating Co. Ltd., Sithe China
Holdings, Coastal Power Production Co., and Consolidated Electric Power Asia--account for
roughly half of the projects.
Over 60 percent of operational FDI power plants are smaller than 100 MW (Table 6).
Plants under construction tend to be much larger.  Over 40 percent are larger than 300 MW.
Small plants are attractive to some foreign private investors because they do not require central
government approval, require less capital and involve less risk, and can be built relatively
quickly.  The increase in plant size over time reflects changes in the government policy
towards FDI in the power sector, changes in the investment environment, and the increasing
experience and confidence of investors.  We explore these issues in more detail in Section 3.4.
FDI plants in operation are heavily concentrated in eastern coastal provinces (Table 7).
Two provinces alone--Jiangsu in the East region and Guangdong in the South-central region--
account for nine of the 24 plants in operation.  FDI plants under construction are more evenly
distributed geographically.  Over 40 percent are located in the North or North-west regions.
Investors' location choices are influenced by, among other things, electricity demand, ease of
doing business, and proximity to fuel supplies.  For example, in Guangdong, which has
attracted a large amount of FDI, electricity supply fell 20 to 30 percent short of demand for
several years in the early 1990s (Li and Dorian, 1995).  Also, the province is quite close to
Hong Kong and boasts an abundance of 'western' business amenities.  Recently, northern
provinces such as Shanxi and Gansu have attracted considerable FDI.  In part, this is due to
reductions in shortages in the eastern coastal provinces and to the government's policy of
encouraging mine-mouth generating plants to reduce pressure on the rail transportation system.
                                               
11 Assuming a range of development cost of $600-$800 per kWh, and an average foreign share of 50 percent,
total foreign investment in FDI projects that or have come on line since 1995 or that are under construction is
$3.9 - 5.2  billion.Blackman and Wu  RFF 98-50
11







(%) Location Op. Date
In Operation
AES China Gen. Co. Ltd. USA oil 15 9.2 25 Guangdong 1996
AES China Gen. Co. Ltd. USA hydro 26.5 14.7 51 Hunan 1996
AES China Gen. Co. Ltd. USA oil 63 29.5 55 Jiangsu 1997
AES China Gen. Co. Ltd. USA coal 250 118 25 Anhui 1996
AES China Gen. Co. Ltd. USA gas 48 29.8 35 Sichuan 1998
AES China Gen. Co. Ltd. USA coal 50 30.4 70 Sichuan 1998
AES China Gen. Co. Ltd. USA oil 116 60 70 Anhui 1997
AES China Gen. Co. Ltd. USA coal 250 151.3 70 Henan 1998
Coastal Power Pdn. Co. USA diesel 40 26 60 Jiangsu 1997
Coastal Power Pdn. Co. USA diesel 72 43 80 Jiangsu 1997
Coastal Power Pdn. Co. USA gas 76 60 Jiangsu 1996
Cons. Electric Power Asia USA coal 700 526 50 Guangdong 1987
Cons. Electric Power Asia USA coal 1980 1,870 27 Guangdong 1995
Enron Global Power USA gas 150 150 50 Hainan 1996
GE Capital USA gas 400 250 30 Shanghai 1997
IES USA coal 36 26 50 Zhejiang
Illinova Generating USA coal 24 11 60 Zhejiang 1992
Intraco USA coal 10 Jiangsu 1998
Sithe China Holdings France oil 66 48 Guangdong 1996
Maeda, et al. Trading Co. Japan gas,dl 173 Hainan 1994
National Power Intl. UK coal 65 80 Anhui 1997
National Power Intl. UK coal 65 68 Shejiang 1997
National Power Intl. UK coal 50 70
National Power Intl. UK coal 145 70 Hubei 1996
Under Construction
AEP Resources Intl. USA coal 250 172 70 Henan
AES China Gen. Co. Ltd. USA coal 2100 1600 25 Shanxi 2000
CEA USA coal 600 216 30 Gansu
Combined Energy Cos. USA coal 50 Henan
Entergy USA coal 24 92 Jiangsu
New World Power Corp. USA hydro 39 12 Fujian 1998
Panda Energy International USA coal 100 155.2 Hebei 1999
Sithe China Holdings France coal 100 128.4 40 Hebei
Sithe China Holdings France coal 45 80 Jiangsu
Siemens AG GDR coal 750 650 25 Shandong 1999
Siemens AG GDR coal 1320 1000 25 Hebei 2000
Formosa Plastics Group Taiwan coal 3600 3800 Fujian
(Source:  International Private Power Quarterly 1998 II, Survey)
                                               
12 We do not count investment from Hong Kong companies as foreign investment as Hong Kong returned to
Mainland China in July 1997.Blackman and Wu  RFF 98-50
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200 - 299 2 1
100 - 199 4 2
50 - 99 8 1
0 - 49 7 3
All 24 12
(Source:  International Private Power Quarterly 1998 II, Survey)
Table 7.  Location of FDI power plants









(Source:  International Private Power Quarterly 1998 II, Survey)
Table 8.  Type of FDI power plants
Type In operation Under
construction
Coal-fired (> 200 MW) 4 6
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Only about half of the operational FDI plants are coal-fired (Table 8).  The bias
against coal-fired plants is partly due to the fact that largely imported gas- and oil-fired plants
tend to be small and relatively easy to finance and build.  In addition, several eastern coastal
provinces where electricity demand is strongest do not have easy access to the coal.  This bias
is clearly diminishing.  Half of the FDI plants under construction are large coal-fired plants.
FDI power plants in operation and under construction represent a small percentage of
projects for which some kinds of agreement or contract have been reached.  By 1994, at least
50 projects were awaiting the approval of the State Planing Commission and 400-500 projects
were in various stage of negotiation (Tyler, 1994; Walker, 1994).  There is clearly a sizable
gap between contracted and realized FDI in the power sector.  We discuss the factors that
account for the low conversion rate of contracted power projects in the next section.
3.4   Institutional Barriers to FDI
Institutional factors have weighed heavily in the decisions of private foreign investors.
The central government intentionally put in place three "barriers" to FDI -- ownership
restrictions, rate of return restrictions, and project approval requirements -- in order to limit
foreign ownership of strategic infrastructure and, perhaps more important, to limit local
control of FDI.  After the central government opened the door to private investment in the
power sector in 1993, it feared that foreign investors would negotiate unacceptably favorable
terms with local governments which had strong incentives to both alleviate chronic power
shortages and to raise revenue through Sino-foreign joint-ventures.  The central government
was also concerned about the impact that FDI projects might have on foreign exchange
outflows and inflation (IPPQ, 1995 III).  It refused to approve a single joint venture power
plant for almost two years, from December 1992, to November 1994, holding up the
construction of 50 projects (Tyler, 1994).
As discussed below, many of the most onerous ownership, rate of return, and
regulatory restrictions have eased in the last two to three years, perhaps because they
occasioned an unforeseen drop-off in FDI.  The central government probably overestimated
the enthusiasm of foreign investors early on, thinking that the initial surge of interest reflected
sizable expected profits that would be robust to regulatory restrictions.
Ownership restrictions.  The March 1994 Interim Regulations for the Use of Foreign
Investment for Power Projects, the first comprehensive attempt to codify rules governing FDI,
mandated that Chinese partners in non-BOT joint ventures maintain a controlling interest in
plants with a unit capacity larger than 299 MW or a total capacity larger than 599 MW.
Wholly-owned foreign ventures of any scale were allowed.  Also, foreign entities were not
permitted to own more than 30 percent of existing plants (Petroleum Economist, 1996).
Given these regulations, foreign investors wanting to build large plants were left with two
choices -- minority control or full ownership -- neither of which was ideal.  Minority
ownership created difficulties with shareholders, while full ownership precluded strategic
alliances with Chinese partners.  Ownership restrictions have eased in the last two years.Blackman and Wu  RFF 98-50
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Foreign partners in joint ventures are now allowed to have a controlling interest in all type of
plants except nuclear plants and hydro plants larger than 250 MW.
Rate of return restrictions.  Beginning in 1993, the State Planning Commission, which
must approve all FDI projects costing more than $30 million, stopped approving projects with
rates of return in excess of 12 percent, and later 15 percent.  Though rate of return caps on
FDI power projects are not uncommon in developing countries, the Chinese cap was set at an
unusually low level given the risks involved.  In other Asian countries, rates of return in
excess of 20 percent are the norm (Tyler, 1994; Lucas, 1994).  The rate of return cap has had
at least two impacts.  First, many foreign investors have lost interest completely.  And second,
a bias has been created in favor of small-scale projects that do not need central government
approval (Engardio and Einhorn, 1994, see discussion of government approval below).
Like ownership restrictions, rate of return restrictions have been relaxed.  The present
15 percent cap is recognized to be "soft."  Power authorities will allow higher returns when
projects have attractive qualities such as use of advanced technologies (Shi, 1997).
Project approval requirements.  As proposals for FDI projects flooded into the PRC in
the early 1990s, it quickly became apparent that there was no established process for government
review and approval.  Though the process has solidified since then, it remains ill-defined and
time consuming, lasting anywhere from 18 to 60 months.  Deutsche Morgan Grenfell, a leading
emerging markets investment banker, has described it as "tortuous" (Su, 1997).
As outlined in "Regulation for Utilization of Foreign Capital in China's Power
Industry" published in August 1997, the approval process has three components:  project
establishment, final industry approval, and Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic
Cooperation (MOFTEC) approval.13  The project establishment phase begins with submission
of initial documentation to a lower level (municipal, county, or local) office of the power
authority.14  This office coordinates the review of the documents with outside governmental
organizations (e.g., offices of environmental protection, fuel supply, construction, and
planning), the most arduous and time consuming part of the approval process.  If project
establishment is approved by local-level authorities, it may then require approval by the
central government, namely by the central offices of the power authority, the State Planning
Commission, MOFTEC, and the State Council.  The power authority unofficially requires
                                               
13 This description is based on Turner (1997a).  Complied by the MEP, the "Regulation for Utilization of
Foreign Capital in China's Power Industry" is comprised of a number of relevant regulations including "Certain
Provisions of Foreign Investment Power Projects," (March 20, 1997); "Interim Provision on the Application and
Approval Procedures for Power Projects with Foreign Direct Investment," (December 9, 1996); and "Interim
Measures on Standardizing the Administration of Power Purchase Contracts." (September 29, 1996).
14 Initial documentation consists of a "preliminary feasibility study report" which outlines the financial,
technical and contractual elements of the project, and for projects where a foreign partner has already been
identified, a "letter of intent"  and "project proposal" which outline the division of responsibilities between the
Chinese and foreign partners.Blackman and Wu  RFF 98-50
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central approval for all projects larger than 25 MW; MOFTEC requires it of all projects
costing more than $30 million; and the State Council requires it of all joint ventures large than
$100 million.  This policy has created incentives for foreign investors to build less-efficient
small plants and/or to break large projects down into smaller phased projects.  Aware that
such investments undermine its energy efficiency goals, the central government has made it a
point to discourage the building small-scale FDI projects (Tan 1997).15
The second phase of the approval process begins with the submission of a detailed
feasibility study report.16  This report must pass through the same lengthy vetting process as
the preliminary report.
The third and final phase of the approval process is review by the MOFTEC that
focuses on enforcing compliance with relevant joint venture laws and regulations.  Projects
smaller than $30 million need only obtain approval at the local branches of the ministry.17
The central government continues to use the approval process to encourage certain
types of investment.  The Ninth Five-Year Plan calls for "giving priority" to FDI projects that:
(i) use domestic equipment; (ii) use domestic contractors and managers; (iii) are located in
less developed Central and Western regions; (iv) are low-cost; and (v) are environmentally
friendly, especially those that involve new technologies.
Inefficiencies associated with state control.  State control of the power sector implies
numerous rigidities and inefficiencies that discourage FDI (see, e.g., Shao et al., 1997).
During the 1990's China has sought to move towards a decentralized market-based structure.
The 1995 Electric Power industry Law established a legal basis for this transformation.  In
January 1997 the central government created the State Power Corporation and in March 1998
it disbanded the MEP.  Though in practice this change has been largely superficial -- many
offices contain essentially the same personnel --  in theory, it was meant to facilitate the
separation of ownership and regulation, a critical first step towards decentralization and
                                               
15 This explicit policy has been reinforced by experiences of foreign investors that have avoided central
government approval by building small plants.  Many have found lack of central government approval makes it
more difficult to secure the cooperation of stakeholders such as fuel suppliers and power agencies and to obtain
bank credit (Turner, 1997a).
16 The feasibility study report includes technical specifications of the plant as well as agreements on power
purchase, grid access, and dispatch, electricity tariffs, foreign currency, exchange rates, and the division of
management responsibilities and technical specifications.
17 A testament to the magnitude of the costs imposed by the approval process is the length to which foreign
investors are willing to go in order avoid one component of it -- central government approval.  For example, an
April 1997 joint venture project headed by Panda Energy International structured a $155 million 2 x 50 coal-
fired project as four separate joint ventures:  one owns the steam and water facilities, a second owns the land and
transmission lines, a third owns one of the generating units, and a fourth owns the other generating unit.  Though
this byzantine set up creates tremendous accounting and administrative burdens, Panda preferred it because it
ensured that all of the joint ventures fell below the $30 million threshold for central government approval
(Nordlund, 1997).Blackman and Wu  RFF 98-50
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eventually elimination of the state monopoly.   In the mean time, however, uncertainty about
the timing and content of reform exacerbates risks for foreign investors.
Foreign Exchange.  FDI firms need to be able to convert revenue earned in RMB into
domestic currency in order to meet debt and profit distribution obligations.  As a result, they
run two types of risks:  price risk and quantity risk.  The first is the risk that the RMB will
depreciate so that real revenues fall.  The second is the risk that sufficient quantities of foreign
currency will not be available when needed.  Until January 1994, China had an officially
pegged exchange rate, and quantity risk was paramount.  The elimination of the official
exchange rate in 1994 has greatly mitigated this problem.
Coincident with the quasi-float of the RMB, China undertook a number of related
reforms that have had an important impact of FDI.  Prior to the reforms, paying foreign
entities in foreign currency was the primary means by which the availability of foreign
exchange was guaranteed.  This was accomplished via so-called 'swap centers.'  The January
1994 reform prohibited the settling of transactions in foreign currency and eliminated the
swap centers.  Now, foreign firms must use a network of banks which provide foreign
exchange subject to the annual approval of the State Administration of Exchange Control
(SAEC).  The central government no longer guarantees that sufficient foreign exchange will
be available.  However, it has stated that infrastructure projects approved by the State
Planning Commission will have priority access to foreign exchange.  Moreover, investors are
able to get 'quasi-guarantees' from quasi-official agencies or corporations.
There is general agreement that the recent reforms have reduced foreign exchange
risks.  Yet, foreign exchange continues to be an important concern for foreign investors since
creditors often insist on assurances that foreign exchange will be made available.
Electricity Pricing.  FDI projects depend critically on electricity prices which are state
controlled, generally at below-market levels.  Though China's ultimate goal is to a single
market-based price for all users on each power grid by 2000, today a complex system of
subsidies remains in place (for a description, see Shao et al., 1998).  Pricing depends on the
vintage of the power plant and on the type of consumers.18  In coastal provinces, average
prices are 10 to 15 percent below long run marginal cost.  In interior provinces, they are and
30 percent or more below marginal cost (IPPQ, 1998 II).
Piecemeal reforms of the pricing system began in 1985.   The December 1995 Law on
Electric Power codified and extended these reforms.  Under this law, FDI plants are free to
negotiate prices with power purchasers subject to state approval.  According to the central
power authority, prices charged by FDI plants should facilitate a reasonable rate of return and
are "restrained only by the ability of the consumer to pay" (Petroleum Economist, 1996).
                                               
18 New power plants charge higher prices than old ones.  Large industry and agricultural users pay the lowest
prices while small industry and commercial users are charges the highest (MEP, 1995).Blackman and Wu  RFF 98-50
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The negotiation of electricity prices is one of the most contentious and problematic
aspects of project approval for foreign investors (see e.g., Korski, 1997).  Once tariffs are set
during the approval process they are generally subject to an annual review at which time
adjustments can be made for any generating cost increases.  This creates problems for investors
because price increases can lag far behind cost increases and because the approval of price
increases is not certain.  To mitigate this problem, foreign investors have sought to negotiate
pre-approved formulas for adjusting prices to reflect cost changes.  Traditionally, pricing has
been the domain of local authorities.  Recently, however, central authorities have attempted to
usurp this control.  This has also created bureaucratic problems for foreign investors.
Contract enforcement.  The viability of foreign firms in China depends critically on their
ability to enforce business contracts in an environment in which contract law is still in its infancy.
Though legal uncertainties affect contracting for construction, fuel supply, labor, and cooperative
joint ventures, they are perhaps most daunting for so-called 'power purchase contracts.'
Power purchase contracts require that the power purchaser -- usually a local
government owned power bureau -- buy a 'minimum take' from the plant for a fixed term at a
fixed price schedule.  The minimum take, term, and price schedule are all negotiated before
plant construction begins based on the plant's projected operating costs.  The term of  the
contract can range from 10 years to 30 years.
Perhaps the most serious risk run by FDI power plants is that the power purchaser will
not buy the contracted minimum take.  At the present time, the Chinese government maintains
that, given existing electricity shortages, power purchase contract default should never actually
occur.  Nevertheless, default risk is real -- especially in areas where large economically
unstable state-owned industrial enterprises account for a major share of electricity demand --
and is likely to be exacerbated by economic slowdowns associated with the Asian economic
crisis (IPPQ, 1998 II).  Financiers of FDI ventures often require some type of assurances
regarding default.  In the past, payments to foreign ventures were often guaranteed by the
government.  But the central government has made it clear that such guarantees will no longer
be available.  Exacerbating the problem is the fact that joint venture plants often include power
purchasers as a partners, an arrangement that enables foreign investors to obtain favorable
contract terms, but limits legal recourse in case of contract default.
Trade and financing restrictions.  In April 1996 China eliminated foreign investor's
exemptions from tariffs and duties on imported generation equipment smaller than 350 MW.
Import tariffs of 38 percent on generating equipment smaller than 350 MW (versus 6 percent
for larger units) create strong incentives to use domestic equipment (Gruettner, 1997).
Generally foreign investors prefer to leverage their equity capital with debt at ratios of
at least 4:1.  This is often problematic in the PRC for two reasons.  First, regulations require
that investors contribute equity of 20 to 40 percent, depending on the size of the project (IPPQ
1998 II).  And second, because of the risks discussed above, and because many players in
China have limited credit histories, debt financing has been in short supply, especiallyBlackman and Wu  RFF 98-50
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preferred "limited-recourse" and "non-recourse" loans which restrict creditors' access to
revenues other than those generated by the power project.
Innovative solutions.  Increasingly, investors are finding innovative ways of
overcoming impediments to FDI in the Chinese power sector.  An example is an October
1996 project agreement for a joint venture between Sithe China Holdings Limited ("Sithe")
and two Tangshan Government controlled utility companies to build and operate 2 x 50 MW
coal-fired cogeneration plant.  Involving US $128.4 million in limited-recourse financing, the
project agreement has been heralded as a model for future deals because it employs a number
of innovative contractual tools to allocate the risks discussed above (e.g., Starke 1997).
To minimize contract enforcement and operations risks, Sithe put in place a termination
agreement with one of its Chinese partners, Tangshan Power, wherein Tangshan Power must
buy out Sithe's interest in the plant in the event of certain adverse circumstances such as failure
by government official to implement the agreed upon tariff formula.  The People's Insurance
Company of China, the largest state-owned insurance company in China, underwrites Tangshan
Power's obligation under the termination agreement.  The insurance company also covers
political "force majeure" events such as expropriation, war, and restrictions on foreign currency
remittance.  To reduce construction risk, Sithe negotiated a first-ever fixed-price date-certain
engineering, procurement and construction (EPC) turnkey contract with a well-recognized
international contractor.19  To reduce uncertainty about fuel availability, Sithe succeeded in
negotiating a 20 year coal supply contract with one of China's ten largest mines.  Finally, to
minimize foreign exchange risk, China International Trust Investment Corporation, the largest
non-bank financial institution in China has agreed to use its best endeavors to ensure that the
project has access to foreign currency to cover its needs for 20 years.
In addition to the financial and contractual innovations developed by foreign investors,
the PRC is experimenting with new procedures to overcome some of the problems that have
plagued FDI.  Chief among these is competitive bidding for BOT projects  (Traditionally, BOT
projects like Hopewell's Shajio B in Guangdong are negotiated).  The PRC has already
approved two BOT projects using a competitive bidding process and tendered packages for
others.20  The power authority's long term goal is to require competitive bidding for all foreign
capital (Tan, 1997).  Competitive bidding has several desirable properties:  it is relatively
transparent; it removes the need for a cap on rates of return as it presumably selects for the
lowest return on investment that investors will accept; it greatly streamlines the approval
process; it ensures that investors work with sophisticated and professional government
                                               
19 Under this arrangement, the contractor agrees to build the plant and turn it over to Sithe for a fixed price and
to guarantee the plant's completion date and performance.
20 The two BOT projects that have been approved are (i) a 2x350 MW second phase of the Laibin coal-fired
plant in Guanxi Shuang Autonomous Region tendered in December 1995 and awarded to EDF/GEC-Alsthom in
September 1997 and (ii) a 2x350 MW Changsha coal-fired plant in Hunan Province tendered in April 1997 and
awarded to National Power in October 1997.Blackman and Wu  RFF 98-50
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personnel; and in general competitively bid projects are "bankable", that is international
lenders are willing to provide financing (Turner 1997b).
4.   SURVEY RESULTS
In July 1997, we conducted a mail survey of 35 US firms that have developed power
projects in China, or that have tried to do so.  We focus on US firms because, as discussed in
Section 3.3, they are responsible for the lion's share of FDI in operation and under
construction in the Chinese power sector.  We received responses from 14 companies which
between them have experience with 75 projects or project proposals.21  We asked each
company to provide general information about FDI in the Chinese power sector and also to
provide detailed information about any projects currently in the proposal, construction, or
operation stage.  We received detailed information about 20 such projects comprising 13 of
the 24 FDI projects in China that are in operation and four of the 12 projects that under
construction (Table 6).  Because the data was provided with the caveat that it remain
confidential, we are only able to present summary statistics.  Also, we note that to preserve
confidentiality, some respondents declined to answer some questions.  We indicate response
rates for each question below.
4.1   Sample Plant Characteristics
Of our 20 sample plants, 13 are in operation, 3 are under construction, and four are in
planning stages.  Not surprisingly, our sample confirms the trends in location, type and size
described in Section 3.3.  All but one of the operational plants are located coastal regions,
while a third of the plants under construction are located in the north.  Seven of the 13 plants
already in operation are gas-, oil- and diesel-fired plants smaller than 100 MW, while the
majority of plants under construction or in planning are larger coal-fired plants (Table 9).
Four of the sample plants are expansions of existing plants.  Interestingly, four are
peaking plants.  This suggests that efforts to mitigate the shortage of such plants have had a
significant impact.
Majority control of a cooperative joint venture with a local governmental organization
is clearly the most popular contract structure for American FDI.  Over two-thirds of our
sample plants are cooperative joint ventures.  All but one of the remaining plants are equity
joint ventures (Table 10).  Foreign investors have a controlling interest in 63 percent of the
joint ventures.  Those plants for which foreigners do not have a controlling interest tend to be
those contracted before regulations prohibiting majority ownership were rescinded.  Chinese
partners in joint ventures are local governmental organizations, in most cases the local power
authority (Table 11).  Build-operate-transfer (BOT) contracts have clearly increased in
popularity as the central government has promulgated guidelines for BOT and tendered BOT
offers.  None of the sample plants are build-operate-own (BOO).
                                               
21 Our respondents had 13 projects in operation, six under construction, eight awaiting final approval, 23 in the
proposal stage, and 25 that had been proposed but were later withdrawn.Blackman and Wu  RFF 98-50
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Table 9.  FDI sample plant type and use of imported equipment
Type Operational Pre-operational
Number Avg. % imp.
equipment
Number Avg. % imp.
equipment
Coal-fired 5 40 5 57
Gas-fired 1 * 1 *
Oil-fired 6 79 0
Hydro 1 * 1 *
All 13 59 7 46
(n = 20 plants)
*Omitted to preserve confidentiality
Table 10.  Contract structure of sample plants
Type In operation Pre-operation
BOT Non-BOT BOT Non-BOT All
Cooper. joint venture 0 7 3 3 13
Equity joint venture 1 2 2 0 5
Wholly-owned venture 0 0 1 0 1
All 1 9 6 3 19
(n = 19 plants)
Table 11.  Types of Chinese partners in joint ventures
Partner Number
Local power authority (LPA) 3
Other local govt. agency (OGA) 7
LPA + OGA 5
LPA + Construction co. 1
LPA + OGA + Investment bank 1
Mining co. 1
(n = 18 plants)Blackman and Wu  RFF 98-50
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4.2 Sample Plant Efficiency
We have both subjective and objective data on energy efficiency.  We present the
subjective data first.  A significant proportion of survey respondents believe that FDI plants
and imported equipment have the potential to improve energy efficiency.  Four of 12
respondents believe that their plant is more efficient than average new wholly-owned Chinese
plants.  Not surprisingly, all four of these plants use advanced generation technologies (we
discuss this point in more detail below).  But there also seems to be support for the view that
FDI plants using imported conventional equipment are superior to new domestic plants using
Chinese equipment.  Four of 15 respondents believe that the Chinese equipment used in their
plants reduces overall energy efficiency.  All four of these plants use conventional
technologies.  We note that given the number of respondents who declined to answer these
questions, our findings must be interpreted with caution.22
To get an idea of the relative efficiency of FDI plants we compare their heat rates to:
Chinese heat rate targets, heat rates of large Chinese plants built between 1983 and 1993, and
heat rates of US plants built between 1985 and 1995 (Table 4).  Perhaps not surprisingly, the
sample FDI plan heat rates compare favorably to efficiency targets for all Chinese plants.  Six
of the seven sample FDI plants with units larger than 50 MW have gross heat rates lower than
2010 target and every one of the eight sample FDI plants with units smaller than 50 MW have
gross heat rates lower than the 2000 target.  As a result, average gross heat rates for sample
plants are well below the most stringent target in every unit size category.
More impressive, the FDI sample plants compare favorably with new Chinese plants
in the two size categories for which both FDI and Chinese data are available.23  Using small-
sample tests, we are able to reject the null hypothesis that FDI and Chinese sample means are
identical at the five percent level.24
More impressive still, the FDI sample plants also compare favorably with new US
plants in every size category.  Using small-sample tests, we are able to reject the null
hypothesis that FDI and US sample means are identical for two of the four size categories --
500 to 600 MW and 0 to 50 MW -- at the 1 percent level.
                                               
22 Additional subjective survey data suggests that FDI plants are not as efficient as they could be.  Four of 14
respondents believe that there are significant institutional barriers to energy efficiency.  Barriers identified in a
follow-on question include pressure to use domestic equipment, over-employment, and dispatch rigidities.
Similarly, four of 17 respondents believe that energy efficiency potential was unrealized because of government
regulation.
23 The source of the Chinese data -- MEP (1993) -- contains heat rate and internal use rate information for 102
Chinese plants that fit the definition 'large industrial enterprise.'  Of these, 33 were built after 1982.  Of these, 26
have uniform unit sizes.  And of these, 10 have unit sizes that are comparable with those of the FDI sample
plants.
24 In addition, the average percentage of electricity used internally (a measure of efficiency) for the 17 FDI
sample plants that provided this data is 5.8 percent, while the average for the 26 Chinese plants built after 1982
for which we have data is 8.2 percent.  A small sample test confirms a significant difference between the sample
means at the 1% level.Blackman and Wu  RFF 98-50
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The relative efficiency of the 20 FDI sample plants is at least partly due to the fact that
seven of them use advanced generation technologies.  Four of the small operational plants
(unit size < 125 MW) employ oil-fired combined cycle gas turbines (CCGT) and one
proposed plant employs integrated gasification combined cycle turbines (IGCC).  Two of the
sample coal-fired plants -- a 50 MW plants under construction and a 1,200 MW proposed
plant -- use fluidized bed combustion (FBC) technology.  Moreover, the plants may actually
be more efficient in a broad sense than our heat rate data indicate.  Five of the sample plants
(including one of the advanced generating technology plants) are cogeneration plants.
What accounts for the high percentage of advanced generating and energy efficiency
technologies in our sample?  In the case of CCGT and FBC plants, market forces are probably
most important.  High energy efficiency despite cycling requirements, the availability of
inexpensive low-grade petroleum fuels, and experienced management can make CCGT plants
competitive with conventional plants in terms of levelized costs.  Similarly, high efficiency
combined with fuel flexibility can make FBC competitive.  However, at this stage in their
applied technological development, is doubtful that IGCC could be competitive.25  While
government policy favoring advanced technologies is likely to have played a secondary role
for the CCGT and FBC plants, it was probably the primary consideration for cogeneration
plants.  Many small plants have added cogeneration facilities in order to ensure government
approval despite official policies discouraging the building of small plants (Global Private
Power, 1998).
The relative efficiency of FDI plants may also be due to their use of imported
conventional equipment.  Overall, 52 percent of the equipment used in the sample plants is
imported versus 24 percent for all Chinese plants.  Though the average percentage of
imported equipment for the sample plants is higher for the six advanced technology plants (71
percent) than for conventional plants (48 percent), the percentage for the latter is still higher
than the percentage for average Chinese plants (Tables 9 and 2).26
4.3 Institutional Factors Influencing Respondents' Equipment, Location, and Scale
Choices
This subsection presents survey data on the extent to which foreign investors'
equipment, location, and scale choices are driven by institutional factors as opposed to
investors' preferences.
                                               
25 The one proposed IGCC plant in our sample something of a special case.  It is an add-on to a pre-existing
industrial coal-gasification plant, and even then will only be built with multilateral financial support.
26 Note however that the average percentage of imported equipment is higher for operational plants than for
those under construction or in planning.  The trend over time away from small gas- and oil-fired units that use a
high percentage of imported equipment towards larger coal-fired units that use more domestic equipment
probably reflects a number of changes in the institutional climate for investment including the imposition of
tariff barriers on imported equipment in 1996.Blackman and Wu  RFF 98-50
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Equipment.  The survey data do not suggest that regulatory and institutional factors
have a strong impact on most foreign investors' equipment choices.  Respondents ranked cost,
reliability, and energy efficiency as the most important determinants of these choices
(Table 12).  However, the data indicate that regulatory and institutional factors -- in particular
contracts mandating the use of Chinese-made equipment, and tariffs on imported equipment --
were important to some investors.
Table 12.  Factors affecting technology and equipment choices:
average ranking on a scale of 1 ( = no effect) to 5 ( = very important)
and percentage of respondents who ranked each as "most important"
Factor Avg. rank % #1 rankings
Cost of equipment 3.6 30
Reliability 3.8 10
Energy efficiency 3.5 30
Construction time 3.3 5
Government regs. and incentives 2.6 0
Financing constraint 2.2 0
Environmental concerns 2.4 0
Fuel flexibility 2.4 5
Other* 2.0 15
Price of coal 2.1 5
(n = 20 plants)
*  Other factors were:  (i) 'did not select equipment,' (ii) 'temporary waiver of taxes on
imported equipment,' and (iii) 'taxes on imported equipment'
Plant type.  The data suggest that there may be some institutional biases that affect the
types of plants foreign investors build.  There are differences between the types of plants that
the 14 firms in our sample claimed they would prefer in the absence of institutional
constraints and the types of plants they actually built (Table 13).  Most striking, not one firm
preferred diesel plants yet such plants comprise one quarter of our sample.
The prevalence of diesel-fired plants despite a professed preference for other types of
plants probably stems from:  the fact that small plants can bypass the convoluted central
government approval processes; pressures to build small plants quickly to an meet urgent
local needs; relatively low risk associated with building small plants and relying on imported
equipment; and the availability of diesel vs. other types of fuel.
Location.  Government policies clearly affect foreign investors' location choices.
Respondents ranked local government support as the most important factor affecting their
location decisions (Table 14).  This is not surprising since, as discussed above, all but one of
the plants in our sample is a joint venture with a local governmental organization, generally a
power bureau.Blackman and Wu  RFF 98-50
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Table 13.  Preference for plant type absent institutional constraints vs. observed choices:
percentage of respondents ranking each as type as first choice
and percentage plants of each type observed
Type % #1 rankings % observed plants
(n =14 firms) (n = 20 plants)
Large coal-fired (> 600 MW ) 21 20
Medium coal-fired (125-600 MW) 21 10
Small coal-fired (<125 MW) 29 20
Gas or oil fired 21 15
Diesel-fired 0 25
Hydro plant 7 10
Renewable plant 0 0
Table 14.  Factors affecting location decision:
average ranking on a scale of 1 ( = no effect) to 5 ( = very important) and
percentage of respondents who ranked each "most important"
Factor Avg. rank % #1 rankings
Local government support 4.6 65
Shortage of electricity in region 4.0 20
Fuel supply 3.2 5
Local infrastructure 2.8 5
Environmental Regulations 2.7 0
Other* 1.3 5
(n = 20 plants)
* Other factors were: (i) "special economic zone" (ii) "central government support"
At the aggregate level, there is not much difference between the regions that firms
claimed they would prefer in the absence of institutional constraints, and the regions they
actually chose.  The populous and industrialized East and South-Central regions are ranked
highest and are home to 85 percent of the sample projects.  However this interpretation is not
fully supported by a comparison of individual respondents' rankings with their actual location
choices.  The two most prolific investors in our sample both rank the Southwest and
Northwest regions highly, perhaps owing to shortages of electricity and the availability of
coal or natural gas in these regions.  Yet these two firms have only one plant in the Southwest
and none in the Northwest.
4.4   Perceived Institutional Barriers to FDI in the Chinese Power Sector
Our survey contained several sets of questions designed to elicit respondents'
perceptions regarding the institutional barriers to FDI in the Chinese power sector.  Among a
list of eight reputed institutional barriers to foreign investment in Chinese power sector,
respondents ranked ambiguity of relevant laws and regulations highest, followed by delay of
the approval process, and control of the rate of return (Table 15).  Regulation of ownership,Blackman and Wu  RFF 98-50
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foreign exchange, electricity pricing were ranked lowest. Our survey also elicited policy
recommendations.  Of the 12 responses we received from our 14 sample firms, five had to do
with making laws and regulation more clear and complete, and four had to do with instituting
competitive contracting and bidding standards.
Table 15.  Institutional barriers to foreign investment in Chinese power sector:
average ranking on a scale of 1 ( = no effect) to 5 ( = severe) and
percentage of respondents who ranked each "most important"
Institutional Barrier Avg. rank % #1 rankings
Ambiguity of relevant laws and reg.s 4.3 36
Delay of approval process 4.3 14
Control of rate of return 4.2 7
Credit risk of power purchaser 3.9 7
Enforcement of contracts 3.8 7
Control electricity pricing 3.7 7
Control of foreign exchange 3.3 0
Regulation of ownership 2.8 7
Other factors* 2.0 14
(n = 14 firms)
* Other factors were: (i) "uncertainty of dispatch and pricing mechanisms" and, (ii) "risk/
reward ratio"
Respondents concerns about the length of the approval process appear to be well-
founded.  Though the average length of the approval process for our sample plants was a
fairly reasonable 16.5 months, there is striking difference in the length of the process for small
and large plants.  For plants smaller than 100 MW, the average was just 6.4 months while the
average for larger plants was 40 months.27
We asked firms in our sample with power projects in other developing countries to
compare features of investment environment in China with those in other countries.  Those
features that compared least favorably were contract enforcement, government control, and
regulatory efficiency (Table 16).  Those features that compared most favorably were the
transmission and distribution system, infrastructure facilities, and the quality of workers.
Finally, among six factors contributing to project risk, fully two-thirds of respondents
ranked enforcement of the power purchase contract most highly (Table 17).
                                               
27 Sixteen of our 20 sample plants completed the approval process.  Of these 10 provided information about the
length of the process.  Seven of these 10 plants were smaller than 100 MW.Blackman and Wu  RFF 98-50
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Table 16.  Features of investment environment in
Chinese power sector compared to other LDCs:




Quality of workers 3.4
Convertibility currency 2.8
Stability government policies 2.2
Efficiency of regulatory authorities 2.1
Government control of investment 2.0
Contract enforcement 2.0
(n = 14 firms)
Table 17.  Factors contributing to project risk:
average ranking on a scale of 1 ( = no effect) to 5 ( = very important)
and percentage of respondents who ranked each "most important"
Factor Avg. rank % #1 rankings
Enforcement of power purchase contract 4.6 66
Changes in government policy 3.7 11
Convertibility of currency 2.6 11
Operational failure 2.9 6
Changes in fuel supply 2.4 6
Inflation 2.1 0
Others 1.2 0
(n = 18 plants)
5.   CONCLUSION
By way of summary and as a prelude to policy prescriptions, we present brief answers
to the four questions posed in the introduction.
What have been the volume and characteristics of FDI in China's power sector?  The
Chinese central government has set extremely ambitious capacity expansion and energy
efficiency targets to alleviate chronic power shortages created by rapid economic growth.
Financing and production constraints dictate that China will need a significant infusion of FDI
to meet these targets.  However, the volume FDI in China's power sector will likely fall short
of the government's year 2000 capacity expansion target of 18 GW by a substantial margin.  It
is unlikely that any more than 13.9 GW of FDI capacity will have come on line by 2000, of
which approximately 8.9 GW has been contributed by Chinese partners in joint ventures.Blackman and Wu  RFF 98-50
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There has been a marked shift in the characteristics of FDI during the 1990's.  FDI
plants already in operation tend to be small-scale, gas- and  oil-fired, largely imported, and
located in the heavily populated and industrialized coastal provinces.  However, half of the
FDI facilities under construction are large coal-fired plants using primarily domestic
equipment, and over 40 percent are located in the north.  Increasingly FDI projects are BOT.
The predominant contract structure for FDI is majority control of a cooperative joint venture
with a local power authority.
What has been the impact of FDI on energy efficiency in the power sector?  Our
survey data suggest that FDI is having a significant positive impact on energy efficiency.
Almost a third of the 20 FDI plants in our sample use advanced efficiency-enhancing
generating technologies (CCGT, IGCC, or FBC), and a fifth are cogeneration plants.  These
high technology plants not only enhance average efficiency when they come on line, but also
have the potential to speed the transfer and diffusion of advanced generating technologies in
the future.
What factors limit the contribution of FDI to energy efficiency in the power sector?
The principal factor that has hampered the contribution of FDI to energy efficiency is an
institutional bias in favor of small-scale plants which are generally not as energy efficient as
the large-scale plants foreign investors would seem to prefer.  This bias stems from:  the fact
that small plants can bypass the convoluted and costly central government approval and
regulatory processes; pressures to build small plants quickly to meet urgent local needs; and
the low risk associated with such plants given their limited scale and reliance on imported
equipment.  The government's new policy of discouraging small plants as well as a marked
shift towards larger plants over time, seems to indicate that, to a certain extent, this bias has
been corrected.
What factors constrain FDI in the power sector generally? Our study indicates that the
most important barriers to FDI are uncertainty associated with the approval process of FDI
projects, electricity sector regulation, and the risk of default on power purchase contracts.
Three barriers that received quite a bit of attention in the trade presses in the mid 1990's --
foreign exchange risks, electricity pricing, and regulation of ownership -- no longer seem to
be of paramount concern to foreign investors, indicating that the policy reforms have had a
significant impact.
The policy prescriptions that flow from our findings are straightforward.  First, if
China hopes to significantly boost FDI to meet its capacity expansion and energy efficiency
goals, it will have to mitigate the barriers of greatest concern to foreign investors -- those
regarding contract enforcement, regulation, and project approval.  Given that Chinese contract
law is still in its infancy, it is probably not realistic to expect dramatic across-the-board
improvements in contract enforcement in the short term.  However, the central government
might consider a targeted effort to strengthen contract enforcement in the power sector.  IfBlackman and Wu  RFF 98-50
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Sithe's Tangshan power project is truly a bellwether, then foreign investors may have found,
in state insurance companies, a means of allocating default risk, albeit one that is untested and
potentially costly.  Happily, state insurance against default risk presumably creates financial
incentives for the central government to enforce power purchase contracts.
With regard to regulation, government officials have mapped out an ambitious
strategy for reform.  The 1995 Electricity Law, pricing reforms, and efforts to separate
ownership and control all represent steps forward.  Unfortunately, the pace of regulatory
reform is bound to be politically determined.
Perhaps the most promising avenue for improving the climate for FDI in the short
term is to codify and streamline the approval process, which by all accounts is unnecessarily
time consuming and arbitrary.  Presumably, the principal benefit of the arduous central
government approval process is that it enables the central government to maintain some
degree of control.  But the costs of the process are substantial.  It clearly creates a bottleneck
that limits the total amount of investment.  Moreover, it creates incentives to build relatively
inefficient small plants.  The latter effect is especially perverse since transnational
corporations have a comparative advantage in building large-scale plants.
While our research indicates that the approval process has slowed the pace of FDI, it
also suggests that it has created strong incentives to enhance energy efficiency and transfer
advanced generating technologies -- the high costs of negotiating the approval process have
strengthened incentives to develop projects that receive special consideration from regulatory
authorities.  Ironically, this implies that if the approval process is reformed, these incentives
will be weakened.  Therefore, efforts to streamline the approval process should be matched by
efforts to strengthen incentives to develop desirable projects.Blackman and Wu  RFF 98-50
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